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Abstract: This paper summarizes the steps to be followed in order to achieve a 
safety verified design of RHEA robots units. It provides a detailed description of 
current international standards as well as scientific literature related to safety 
analysis and fault detection and isolation. 
A large committee of partners has been involved in this paper, which may be 
considered as a technical committee for the revision of the progress of safety 
development throughout the progress of RHEA project. 
Partners related to agricultural machinery, automation, and application 
development declare the interest of providing a stable framework for bringing the 
safety verification level required to be able to commercial unmanned vehicles such 
as those described in the RHEA fleet.   
1. Introduction 
This paper aims at establishing the safety specifications of RHEA robots based on 
current state of the art of safety standards and scientific knowledge. 
The amount of authors reflects the wish of integrating a wide scope of points of 
views on the subject. These authors are committed to set-up a dedicated 
commission that will help the rest of partners on defining the safety functional 
requirements for each of those specialized units. 
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The paper is structured in a number of paragraphs dealing with the typification of 
actual hazards levels of operated machinery ; a review of the safety standard; the 
concept of life cycle assessment in the safety of agricultural machines; the 
assessment of risk; the concept of safety-related control systems for machines; 
hardware and software specifications; the recommendations towards the 
elimination of systematic faults and the definition of safety functions; available 
procedures for fault detection, isolation and prognosis; a review of the safety 
verification level when designing an agricultural machine; the concept of building 
blocks for intelligent mobile equipment and finally the steps to be accomplished for 
RHEA units. 
2. Hazard levels in agricultural work  
Agricultural machinery is involved in the majority of occupational accidents on 
farms, as proven by recent extensive scientific studies from the U.S. and Northern 
Europe (Bunn et al., 2008; Gerberich et al., 1998; Colémont and Van den Broucke, 
2008; Thelin, 1998). 
Although in absolute terms tractors are widely represented in these occurrences, 
large self-propelled harvesters are twice as hazardous as tractors.  Most accidents 
occur in elevation or load transport work (21%), attachment and adjustment (20%), 
or when repairing (17%) machines. There are several variables that are associated 
to a high accident risk. Therefore, for example, working more than 40 hours a week 
multiplies this risk by three, as does the fact of the operator being married (risk 
multiplied by 2), or divorced (risk multiplied almost by 4).  
Some factors that are associated to mortal accidents and which are not mutually 
exclusive are: 49% mechanical (seat belt not used, defective brakes or clutch), 52% 
type of tractor equipment (no rollover protection structure, use of rotary mowers 
or insufficient ballasting), or 55 % due to work location (slopes, muddy terrain).   
The risk of fatality is multiplied by 20 if the tractor rolls over. The lack of a rollover 
protection structure multiplies this risk by 11, while deficient maintenance 
multiplies it by almost 7, the same as for brake or clutch problems.    
Some studies indicate that the user's perception of self-control is also a 
contributing factor in the risk of suffering an accident. It also appears that the 
number of accidents drops when the user has a positive and committed attitude 
towards the safety standards. 
Generally speaking, reducing the presence of an operator without increasing risk 
would lead to an enormous decrease in accidents. Therefore, becoming 
autonomous may be more an advantage than a drawback in terms of safety. This 
argument was first held by Reid (2004a) and should be dearly considered when 
facing the analysis of safety in autonomous agricultural machinery. 
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3. Main safety standards for agricultural machinery  
Making safe machines has become a top priority goal and in recent years, various 
standards have been published. It is important to review these standards.   Figure 1 
shows how the most relevant design and safety standards for general machinery 
are interlinked:  ISO 12100 (safety of machinery, 2003), ISO 14121 (analysis and risk 
assessment, 2007), ISO 13849 (safety-related parts of control systems,  2003-2006), 
as well as for this specific field, ISO 25119: safe design for tractors and agricultural 
machinery( 2009), although the general principles and safety requirements are set 
forth respectively in standards ISO 26322 (2010) and ISO 4254 (2008). 
 
Fig.1. Interlinks between ISO standards related to the safety of machines. 
This clearly shows the huge effort that has been made in the last five years towards 
enhancing safety conditions in the agricultural setting. 
3.1 Life cycle analysis in the safety of agricultural machines 
There are very close links between the various standards pertaining to safety. In 
general, the most recent ones tend to incorporate the content of the previous 
ones. For this reason, the first part of the design standard ISO 25119 offers a more 
global overview of the entire process in the form of a life cycle analysis, from 
conceptual development through to mass production or the alterations that are 
made after a machine enters the mass production stage (see Figure 2). 
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Fig.2. Life cycle analysis in the safety of agricultural machines. (Source: ISO 25119-
1) 
Figure 2 indicates that when mass production commences, special attention will be 
paid to the system design, both hardware and software aspects, using the V-model 
(Fig. 3).  The numbers shaded in grey (a/b) respectively encode the part of the ISO 
25119 standard and the chapter in which they are contained.  
 
Fig. 3. V-model (Source: Lenz et al. 2007) 
It is important to point out that wherever possible the new unit of observation 
(machine under study) should be defined as an alteration of some pre-existing 
system of the same or another manufacturing firm, so that it is possible to avail of 
the legacy of information available in terms of analysis and risk assessment, and 
the corrective measures associated thereto. It has also been proposed that insofar 
as possible, a parallel should be drawn between the hardware and software 
structure for assessment and pre-existing equipment, so that the required 
agricultural performance levels (AgPL) may be more easily allocatable. 
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3.2 Risk assessment 
This section specifically refers to the ISO 14121 standard: Risk assessment. 
According to this standard, it is necessary to distinguish between analysis, which 
consists of determining the limits of the machine, hazard identification and 
quantitative risk estimation, and evaluation, which is the result of deciding on the 
need or otherwise to reduce risk by implementing design measures, incorporating 
protective elements or providing information to the person that may potentially be 
affected.  Figure 5 sums up this process.  
Defining the limits of the machine means considering the intended purpose and 
what kind of incorrect use may reasonably be foreseen, the operating modes 
(transport, work, maintenance), the level of training expected of users (operators, 
maintenance personnel, apprentices and members of the general public); as well as 
the space limitations to be taken into account for the breadth of movements (areas 
within scope) and the dimensional requirements for people.   
In order to identify hazards, as sources of damage, i.e. physical injuries or harm to 
health, it is necessary to consider the operations and tasks that the machine 
performs, as well as those that are carried out by the people that interact with it, 
deciding which are hazardous situations and events, i.e. circumstances and events 
in which one or more people are exposed to one or more risks.  The significance or 
severity of the damage should be defined: S0 (not significant or only requiring first-
aid), S1 (slight to moderate with medical care and full recovery) , S2 (severe with 
lifelong side-effects but probable survival) and S3 (with side-effects in vital 
capacities, uncertain survival and/or severe disability); as should the likelihood of 
the damage occurring: E0 (improbable, maximum once in the machine's useful life, 
< 0.01%),  (rare, annual maximum, 0.01%-0.1%), E2 (sometimes, less than on a 
monthly basis, 0.1-1%), E3 (frequent, more than once a month, 1-10%), and E4 
(very frequent, in almost every operation, >10% ) (see Figure 5).  
The ISO 14121-1 standard is thorough in defining types of hazards: mechanical 
(associated to kinetic or potential energy, and the shape and structure of the 
elements), electric, thermal, noise-related, vibration-related, radiation-related, 
caused by materials or chemical substances, hazards associated to a failure to 
comply with the principles of ergonomics, or the setting in which the machine is 
used (dust or fog, humidity, mud, snow, etc.). The standard also provides several 
examples of tasks in relation to the stage in the life cycle of the machine, as well as 
hazardous situations, which are understood to mean situations that may give rise 
to damage.   
Risk is defined as the combination of the likelihood of damage occurring and its 
severity and, as indicated previously, the concept of risk analysis contemplates 
specifying the limits of the machine, hazard identification and risk estimation.   
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In evaluating risk, the possibility of avoiding or controlling the damage should also 
be taken into consideration:  C0 (easy to control), C1 (simple to control, over 99% 
of people would know how to control it in over 99% of circumstances), C2 (mostly 
controllable, over 90% of people would know how to control it in over 90% of 
circumstances) and C3 (not avoidable by average operator or typical personnel in 
vicinity) (see Figure 5). 
 
Fig.4. Flow diagram linked to assessing risk in agricultural machines. (Elaborated 
from ISO13849-1)  
The ISO 25119-2 standard defines beyond which combination of severity and 
likelihood of damage, and control level it is indispensable to include a control 
system in addition to the inclusion of protection devices or merely informative 
aspects that are generally covered under the term QM, i.e. quality assurance 
measures pursuant to the ISO 9001:2000 standard (see Figure 5). 
3.3 Safety-related control systems for machines 
For cases in which the quality assurance measures do not suffice, it is indispensable 
to include risk reduction systems, the features of which should match the 
performance level.   These systems are generally called SRP/CS, i.e. safety-related 
parts of the control system.  The ISO 25119-2 standard provides five performance 
levels for agricultural equipment (AgPL) identified with the letters "a" to "e" for 
increasing levels of risk. 
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Fig.5. Performance levels for agricultural equipment (AgPL) identified with the 
letters "a" to "e" for increasing levels of risk. (Source: Benneweis, 2006) 
Attaining a particular AgPL depends on a number of factors, such as: the category 
associated to its hardware structure (B, 1, 2, 3 ó 4), the mean time to a dangerous 
fault (MTTFd), diagnostic coverage (DC) and common cause faults (CCF). The 
software readiness levels (SRL) are in turn dependent on the AgPL value that is 
required, the diagnostic coverage available: low (60 to 90%), medium (90 to 99%) 
or high (over 99%) and MMTfd: low (3 to 10 years), medium (10 to 30 years) or high 
(30 to 100 years). The ISO 25119-2 standard defines a simplified procedure for 
assessment, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Fig.6. Performance levels and software readiness levels depending on hardware 
configuration (B, 1, 2, 3 and 4) and the diagnostic coverage level (fault detection 
capacity). (Source: ISO 25119-2) 
3.4 Hardware configurations 
According to the ISO 13849-1 and ISO 25119-2 standards, there are five typical 
hardware configurations (B, 1, 2, 3 and 4) in SRP/CS, which may be displayed in 3 
different diagrams (see Figure 7). The first layout: inputs (I), logical processing (L), 
outputs (O) corresponds to the typical structures B and 1, with the difference that 
in the former, the diagnostic coverage is null and the MTTFd for each channel 
cannot be measured, whereas configuration 1 uses components of proven 
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efficiency in safety-related operations and may require redundant inputs 
depending on the diagnostic coverage required (low or medium). The second 
layout, which corresponds to the type 2 architecture, includes as well as the above 
elements, other testing equipment (TE, typically man-machine interfaces) and the 
outputs of the testing equipment (OTE).   Finally, architectures 3 and 4 are the third 
layout, with the difference that for the latter, the diagnostic coverage in monitoring 
(m) is higher than in architecture 3, and that redundant outputs may be necessary 
in order to maintain the safety functions.   
Another relevant aspect of the standard is that it also defines how to calculate the 
performance level when there are several SRP/CS attached in series. Generally 
speaking, when there are more than 2 or 3 SRP/CS in series with the same 
minimum AgPL level, the global value drops by a level, e.g. from level AgPL d to 
AgPL c. 
 
Fig.7. Predefined hardware configurations in the ISO 13849 and ISO 25119 
standards. (Elaborated from Lenz et al. 2007) 
Figure 7 shows a first approach towards the integration of several SRP/CS of 
varying hardware configurations that communicate with Bluebotics controller via 
Ethernet, while the latter interact with internal bus of the tractor via ISO11783 
(ISOBUS). It is important to state that any hardware configuration should follow 
ASABE recommendations regarding environmental conditions (ASABE, 2008).  
3.5 Software Specifications 
In this sense, Hoffman (2006) provides probably the most complete review of 
actual complexity of software in tractors, given the great number of factors that 
affect the integrity of software in machines equipped with electronic systems, it is 
not possible to define an algorithm that will ascertain which techniques and 
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measures are best suited to each application. On the other hand, when selecting 
methods and measures for defining software, it is important to bear in mind that as 
well as the manual code programming, model-based developments may employ 
automatic code generation tools.  (Lutz, 1992) 
The ISO 25119-3 standard (2009) devotes forty pages to the chapter on software in 
relation to the safety of agricultural machines and indicates that it is necessary to 
define the method to be employed in defining the safety requirements for the 
software: natural language, semi-formal methods (based on diagrams and figures, 
or animation-based analyses), formal methods (based on mathematical 
procedures), or methods that employ computer-assisted tools (in the form of 
databases that can be automatically inspected and examined to assess consistency 
and completeness).   
In general, the standard provides that the software architecture should not be 
commenced until a sufficient degree of maturity has been attained in defining the 
safety requirements, employing top-down methods to evaluate the combination of 
events that may give rise to hazardous situations, and bottom-up methods to 
decide which components in the system would be damaged.  
In developing the software, the first step will be to define the modules that will be 
related to safety and then define the rest of the functions. The programming 
language should be such as to enable easy code verification, validation and 
maintenance.  In this regard, it is desirable to use automatic code translation tools, 
pre-existing libraries that have been extensively verified, code debugging systems 
and software version control tools. It is not clear if object-oriented languages are 
preferable to procedure-based languages.  
The use of defensive programming methods is recommended, capable of producing 
programmes that can detect control flows or erroneous data, so that the system 
may react in a predetermined and acceptable manner. Some defensive 
programming techniques include: changing that variables are in range and 
analysing the credibility of their values, a priori checks on parameters and 
procedures before running them, and separating parameters according to whether 
they are read-only or read-write.   
In general, the following criteria should be followed: the programme should be 
divided into small software modules, the modules should be composed using 
sequences and iterations, a limited number of paths should be maintained in the 
software, complex ramifications and unconditional leaps should be avoided, loops 
should be linked to input parameter values, and complex calculations should be 
avoided when making decisions on forks and loops.  Lastly, they recommend that 
dynamic variables be limited so that the memory requirements and a priori 
directions are known a priori. The use of interruptions should also be limited, 
especially when using critical software, so that the maximum time for inhibiting 
safety functions is controlled at all times.  The use of check-lists is recommended in 
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order that the set of relevant issues are verified in each stage of the life cycle of the 
software. 
3.6 Eliminating systematic faults and safety functions 
There are a number of typical faults for which the ISO 25 119-2 (2009) standard 
provides certain recommendations: preventing the loss of electricity supply in 
electronic boxes, selecting manufacturing materials that are suitable for the setting 
in which they are to be used, correct component installation, compatibility, 
modularity of design, restricted use of common elements such as memories or 
electronic cards, separating safety-related and non-safety-related components in 
the control system, and checking design by employing assisted design systems for 
simulation and simulation programmes.   
A number of typical safety functions are also defined by the ISO 25119-2 standard 
for consideration in design, i.e. 1) a lock to prevent switching on the system by 
accident, 2) the immediate halt function, 3) manual resetting, 4) automatic 
switching on and resetting after a fault, 5) response time (divided into detecting 
the fault, starting to take measures and managing to attain a safe operating mode), 
6) safety-related parameters (position, speed, temperature, pressure), 7) external 
control functions (how to select external control, verify that switching the external 
control does not cause hazardous situations, and how to act in the event of loss of 
external control), 8) manual inhibition of safety functions (for example, for 
diagnostic purposes), and 9) the availability of alarms for the user. 
3.7 Fault detection and diagnosis to improve safety 
Once the safety functions have been defined, it is important to foresee available 
algorithms and procedures that are used in other fields of work such as spacecraft. 
In this sense NASA has show to be far ahead and the definitions provided are 
considered of major interest: 
 Fault detection: addressing the occurrence of a miss function of any kind in a 
system, realizing that something is going wrong. 
 Fault diagnosis: fault isolation, determining the cause of failure or what is 
particularly wrong in many cases as a source of common cause fault (CCF). 
 Fault prognosis: detection the precursors of failure and predicting the 
remaining time before failure occurrence. 
The procedures that can be used for any of the three tasks can be classified into 
model-based or data –driven (model-free) (Donca and Mihaila, 2010). 
 Model-based fault diagnosis and prognosis: consisting either on qualitative or 
quantitative models that take advantage of fundamental knowledge of the 
problem. 
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 Data-driven fault diagnosis and prognosis: it is also referred as history-based 
knowledge. Methods available for Data-driven Fault Diagnosis and Prognosis 
combine: Data mining (also known as Knowledge Discovery in Databases KDD), 
Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Statistics. 
According to the nature of the information available we may define numerical and 
text data, and for the latter, further classification into structured (fit into narrow 
fields in databases) and unstructured text (nearer to natural language) is a relevant 
issue. In this context Text Mining refers to the tools that allow extracting 
knowledge from databases typical from customer (after-sales) services where 
unrestricted textual format for fault description is used (Harding et al., 2006; Hui 
and Jha, 2000). 
There are several review papers and dedicated researches that make use of the 
three types of information for fault detection and diagnosis: Vibration signatures, 
CAN data and Warranty data. 
For vibration signatures the following methods have been described and reviewed 
in the literature (2005 to 2010) (Schwabacher, 2005): 
 Data-Driven Fault Detection: unsupervised anomalies detection algorithms 
(Orca, Grobot, DIAD), inversion induction monitoring System (data cluster into 
system modes), Neural Networks (NN) and envelope detection by means of 
hidden Markov models. 
 Data-Driven Diagnosis: Feature extraction on data (Fast Fourier Transform in 
frequency domain, while signal energy and kurtosis in time domain), Support 
Vector Machines (SVM), wavelet transform and wavelet packet transform 
combined with SVM. 
 Data-Driven Prognosis: NN, rule extractors, similarity based methods, 
autoregressive methods, fuzzy logic algorithms and Bayesian Belief NN.  
 Model-based Diagnosis: hierarchical models with finite state machine. 
 Model-based Prognosis: Kalman filters and stochastic differential equations. 
For CAN data a very recent publication (Suwatthikula et al., 2011) proposes the use 
of Adaptive Neural Fuzzy Inference Systems (ANFIS) for the prediction of Network 
Health and fault diagnosis in CAN networks based on total differential resistance on 
the bus and the amount of error frames per second. It also enables to distinguish 
between internal (typically digital) and peripheral (mainly analogue) faults. 
The characteristics of the ideal fault diagnosis system, as referred in 2010 by the 
only paper on FD in agricultural machinery (Craessaerts et al., 2010), include: 
1)quick detection and isolation of faults, 2) robustness against noise and 
uncertainties, 3) novelty identification for unseen cases, 4) classification error 
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estimate, 5) adaptability to time varying processes, 6) low modelling and low 
computational requirements, and 7) multiple fault identification (several at a time). 
The incorporation of fault detection and diagnosis tools for autonomous machinery 
is to play an important role for safety purposes. 
3.8 Safety verification level when designing an agricultural machine  
In accordance with the ISO 25119-1 standard, one very important aspect when 
designing an agricultural machine is deciding on the safety verification level that 
may require the participation of persons not linked to design, teams of staff other 
than designers, or even different departments or consultancy firms, for the 
agricultural performance (AgPL) levels, which go from "a" to "e" in ascending order 
(see Table 1). 
Table 1. Degree of verification (Source: ISO 25119-1) 
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3.9 Building blocks for Intelligent Mobile Equipment (robots) 
Some authors (Reid, 2004b) have defined unmanned vehicle not exactly in terms of 
safety requirements but as related to building blocks.  
In this case the blocks are agents than can provide important complementary 
information to the safety function through the main controlled designed by 
Bluebotics. 
The building blocks of intelligent mobile equipment proposed by Reid (2004b) are 
shown in Figure 8. The elements are defined in terms of Machine Control (X-by-
Wire and Navigation), Machine Awareness (Localization and Perception), and 
Intelligence (Mission Planning and Intelligent Systems). Hereafter, it is useful to 
further define the blocks: 
X-by-Wire: These are basic control of the actuation surfaces of a machine that 
include the steering, brakes, throttle and other functions. It also relates to the basic 
machine health and the interaction of these controlled components.  
Navigation: Elements of Navigation relate to how the various control systems lead 
to machine mobility. Navigation is concerned with issues of path tracking accuracy 
and how machine functions respond in a mission.  
Localization: Localization is the awareness of the posture of the intelligent vehicle 
relating to position and orientation in the open environment.  
Perception: Perception is the awareness of the features of the local surroundings 
that can include obstacles and other environmental features. Perception is a key 
element of vehicle safeguarding in the sense that obstacle features are detected 
with perception sensors.  
Mission Planning: Mission Planning systems allow the determination of the tasks 
and behaviors of an intelligent machine system in the operating environment. All of 
these functions are connected by an intelligent control system that can arbitrate 
what needs to happen under dynamically changing situation. Path planning is one 
of the key tasks that are controlled in mission planning. Mission planning tools like 
simulation are a key part of advanced system development.  
Intelligent Systems: The semi-autonomous or autonomous vehicle is an intelligent 
system. It has an architecture that is both modular and scalable to allow it to be 
deployed for application. 
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Fig.8. Building blocks for Intelligent Mobile Equipment (Source: Reid, 2004b) 
 
4. Steps to be accomplished for “RHEA” robots 
RHEA proposes the use of three robot fleets. The 3 ground mobile units will be 
based on small autonomous vehicles similar to New Holland tractor “Boomer 3050 
CVT”– (4×4 wheel drive) powered by an engine (51 Hp) with a unit weight 
estimated in about 1.2 ton. The units will follow the rows at a speed of about 
6km/h – with onboard equipment for navigation and application of treatments. The 
electronic equipment on-board the ground mobile units will be powered by a 
system based on solar panels and fuel cells.  
Below are summarized the principal details of each ground mobile unit:  
 Sprayer Boom Vehicle in wheat:  
This vehicle will be equipped with a spray boom (Fig.9) that will apply herbicide 
on wheat crops based on the information from the perception system on board 
the aerial units. The goal is to apply herbicide to at least 90% of the detected 
patches.  
 Physical weed control vehicle in maize: 
This ground mobile unit will be equipped with end-effectors or tools, developed 
to destroy weeds in maize, which will be based on both thermal and mechanical 
devices (Fig.9). The goal is to destruct at least 90% of the detected weeds. 
The main idea is to equip the ground mobile unit with a 4.5 m hoe equipped 
with rigid or rotating tools for interrow cultivation and selective tools for in-row 
weed control. However, the best solution in this case could be the use of 
flaming, according to the high selectivity and the very low cost (in this respect, 
very simple, cheap, and easy to use and to adjust burners that are connected to 
very low LPG consumption will be developed). 
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 Insecticide Application Vehicle in Olive: 
The third vehicle will be equipped with a spray system to apply pesticide in olive 
trees (Fig.9). The goal is to apply the pesticide at least on 90% of the tree 
canopy. 
   
Fig.9. View of the different robot units (Sprayer boom, Physical control, and  
Insecticide unit). 
According to the definitions and specifications provided in previous paragraphs, 
Figure 10 provides a first approach toward the safety control loop of the vehicle. It 
is important to indicate that since around 10 safety functions have been identified 
and more than 20 sensors will most probably be providing information, and 
therefore a safety logic unit should be used for the safety loop. 
  
Fig. 10. Basic safety (Elaborated form: SICK Optic-Electronic, S.A.) 
At this stage it is very important to clarify the tasks that should be considered in the 
particular case of RHEA for the risk assessment and therefore to define the 
performance level required for every SRP/CS.  
Table 2 provides an example of tasks that take place during 3 diffrenets operating 
modes: labor, maintenance and transport, as defined by one of the end users in the 
RHEA project. This table should be considered by other partners in order to provide 
a similar approach for every of the three units.  All partners should provide safety 
information concerning the most similar machine on equipment as stated at the 
beginning of the paper. Generally speaking, such manuals address the three 
operation modes and thus will be of highest relevance. 
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Table 2. Spraying tasks RHEA robot unit 
Labor Maintenance Transport 
Before Mechanical  Attachment 
 Checking Lighting 
System 
 Checking Elements 
That Could Shed 
Or Hang From The 
Machine 
 Attachment (3 Points; PTO; Electric; Oil 
Hydraulic Jacks) 
 Filling With Water 
 Opening Bar and System Testing 
(Check Filters And Nozzles) 
 Addition Agrochemicals 
 Cleaning, Check and 
Lubrication Of Moving Parts 
(Bar; Suspension System; 
Pump And PTO; Hydraulic 
Actuators) 
During Hydraulic 
 Bars Opening and Closing 
 PTO Manipulation 
 Fill Water And Agrochemicals 
 Navigation 
 Cleaning and Replacement 
(Filters, Nozzles, Pipes, 
Manometers) 
After Electric 
 Cleaning (Clean Water Spray; Clean 
Filters)  
 Release (3 Points; PTO; Electic; Oil 
Hydraulic Jacks) 
 Checking, Cleaning (Valves, 
Connection Boxes, Wiring, 
Other Sensors And 
Actuators) 
 
5. Conclusions 
A dedicated review of safety standards and scientific state on this subject has been 
carried out in this work. 
This paper aims at acting as the corner stone in the process of definition of safety 
specifications, functions and verification levels. 
When all partners in the project agree and follow the recommendations described 
in the papers, the consortium should be confident in meeting a safety design at the 
end of the project. 
A commission constituted by the authors of the paper together with the 
coordinator will be in charge of verifying the progress throughout the project 
stages.  
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